What would the Optimizely payload have done on your website?
A free website script and Content Security Policy checker. Enter a domain, or a page such as your contact page, and we read it from our server, name the third party vendors it loads script from, open its Google Tag Manager container if it has one, check the policy and the standard security headers, and say whether that policy would have blocked, limited or allowed the compromised vendor script that hit 178 organisations on 16 November 2026. Nothing is stored.
Updated 17 November 2026
Email me this check as a PDF
Get a formatted PDF of these results by email, to keep or share with your team. We send it once and do not add you to any list.
Want the full read, not just one page?
Send us the result and we will go through the whole site: every page with a form, what the tag manager really fires, which scripts can be served from your own domain, and a policy you can enforce. Free, written, no obligation. If the plan needs tooling, we help you select and supply the right software, applying our IDEAL framework.
On 16 November 2026 an attacker wrote code into the Optimizely snippets of 178 organisations, and their own vendor's CDN served card skimming, cookie theft and iOS exploit kits to their visitors for most of a day. Report URI's analysis found that only 15 percent of the affected sites had a policy that blocked it. Allowing the vendor's CDN in the policy did not help. Our account of the day, and the guide on how these attacks work and how to stop them.
How the website script and Content Security Policy check works
What a one page check cannot tell you
It reads one page as HTML, plus the tag manager container if there is one. A tag in the container may fire only on some pages or for some visitors, and scripts loaded by other scripts outside a tag manager are invisible to it, so the real list is at least as long as the one shown. It does not test whether the policy is the same on every page. Run it again on the pages with forms on them, which are the ones that matter most. Some sites return a bot check or an error to any automated request. The full read we offer above covers the gaps, by a person, on the whole site.
Frequently asked questions
What does the website script check do?
It fetches the page you enter, from our server rather than your browser, and reads four things: every script tag that points at a host other than your own, with the vendor named where we recognise it; the Google Tag Manager container if the page loads one, listing the tags inside it and the hosts they refer to; the Content Security Policy in the response headers or a meta tag, including its gaps; and the standard security headers, HTTPS enforcement, cookie flags and subresource integrity. It then applies the policy to the behaviour of the Optimizely payload of 16 November 2026, which ran a vendor script, sent stolen data to an attacker host and opened a hidden frame, and tells you whether your policy would have blocked, limited or allowed each step.
Is this the same as securityheaders.com?
No, though it overlaps. securityheaders.com grades the presence and quality of security headers, and it is a good tool. This check reads the page and the tag manager container as well as the headers, names the vendors your site actually loads script from, and judges the policy against what a real compromised vendor script did, rather than giving a letter grade. Use both.
Can I check a page other than the homepage?
Yes. Enter the page address, such as www.example.co.uk/contact/, and the check reads that page instead. Pages with forms are where stolen keystrokes come from, so the contact, enquiry, login and checkout pages are the ones to run after the homepage. Each run reads one page.
What can the check not see?
It reads the static HTML of one page and, if the page loads Google Tag Manager, the public container file. Scripts that other scripts load at run time outside a tag manager are not visible to it, and a tag inside the container may fire only on some pages or for some visitors, so the container list is what the tag manager may load rather than what it loaded for you. It does not run the page or check other pages. Some sites refuse automated requests and return an error or a holding page, in which case the check reports that rather than guessing.
What do the three verdicts mean?
Script is whether a compromised vendor script would run: blocked if the policy names no third party script host, limited if it runs only when one of the named vendors is compromised, allowed if the policy is open or has unsafe-inline, unsafe-eval, strict-dynamic or a wildcard, and no policy if there is none. Data is whether a script that did run could send what it collected to an attacker host, which connect-src controls. Frames is whether a script could open the hidden frame that delivered the iOS exploit kits, which frame-src controls.
Why does strict-dynamic count against the policy?
strict-dynamic tells the browser to trust any script that an already trusted script loads. That is convenient for tag managers, and it is exactly the chain a compromised vendor script uses to pull in whatever it likes. In the Optimizely incident, policies using strict-dynamic did not stop the payload. Report URI, who analysed the affected sites, found the same for unsafe-eval.
Why does the tag manager matter so much?
A tag manager is one script tag on the page that loads every tag configured in its container at run time, so a page that shows one third party host in its HTML may run code from thirty. Each tag is a supplier with full access to the page, added by whoever had access to the container, and tags from campaigns that ended years ago are common. The check reads the public container file and lists what it may load, which is the inventory most organisations have never written down.
Do you store the domains people check?
No. The check runs, the result is returned to your browser, and nothing is written anywhere. If you email yourself the report or send us the result through the form below, that goes by email like any other enquiry.
Can I check a site I do not own?
The check only reads what any visitor’s browser already receives when it loads the page, so it reveals nothing private. It is intended for your own sites and those of suppliers you are assessing. Please do not run it in bulk; it is rate limited and we will block abuse.
What should I do if the result is not good?
Start with the list of third party hosts and the tag manager container, decide which are still needed, and serve the rest from your own domain where the vendor permits it. Then write a Content Security Policy whose script-src names only your own origin and the hosts you cannot avoid, with connect-src, frame-src, base-uri, object-src and form-action set, and run it in report only mode until the violation reports are quiet. The guide linked on this page walks through it, and we will do the full read for you if you ask.
The outcome groups and the incident figures are from Report URI, 16 November 2026. The check is practical guidance on one page of a site, not a security audit.